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A National Custom: Debating Female
Servitude in Late Nineteenth-Century
Hong Kong1
JOHN M. CARROLL
Department of History, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong,
Email: jcarroll@hkucc.hku.hk
Abstract
This article frames the debate about mui-tsai (meizai, female bondservants) in
late nineteenth-century Hong Kong within changing conceptions of the colony’s
political, geographical and cultural position. Whereas some colonial officials saw
the mui-tsai system as a national shame that challenged Britain’s commitment to
ending slavery, others argued that it was an archaic custom that would eventually
dissolve as China modernized. The debate also showed the rise of a class of
Chinese elites who had accumulated enough power to defend the mui-tsai system
as a time-honouredChinese custom, evenwhile acknowledging that inHongKong
they lived beyond the boundaries of Chinese sovereignty. Challenging notions
of the reach of the colonial state and showing how colonial policies often had
unintended consequences, this debate also reveals the analytical and explanatory
weakness of concepts such as ‘colonial discourse’ or ‘the colonial mind’.
Introduction
On 6 October 1879, Hong Kong Chief Justice John Smale declared
from the bench that ‘two specific classes of slavery exist in this
Colony to a very great extent; viz., so-called domestic slavery, and
slavery for the purpose of prostitution’.2 Passing sentence on five
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented in January 2006 at the Annual
Meeting of the American Historical Association in Philadelphia and in October 2006
at the University of Hong Kong History Department Research Seminar. I am grateful
to the participants in both sessions for their comments.
2 Smale’s declaration, 6 October 1879, enclosed in Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23
January 1880, in Correspondence Regarding the Alleged Existence of Chinese Slavery in Hong
Kong, Presented to BothHouses of Parliament byCommand ofHerMajesty,March1882 (London,
1882), 5, reprinted in Irish University Press Area Studies Series, British Parliamentary
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Chinese defendants convicted of kidnapping children for selling and
of purchasing a girl for prostitution, Smale especially condemned the
age-old mui-tsai practice for violating British and Hong Kong laws
prohibiting slavery. His declaration caused a stir among the local
Chinese community, and less than two weeks later a group of Chinese
merchants petitioned Governor John Hennessy for permission to form
an association to suppress kidnapping and protect kidnapped women
and children. After reminding Hennessy of Captain Charles Elliot’s
proclamation of 2 February 1841 guaranteeing Chinese in Hong
Kong the right to practice their traditional customs, the petitioners
explained in great detail the difference between kidnapping and the
mui-tsai system, a respectable Chinese custom that should be allowed
to continue. They also warned that banning the system would force
poor families in Guangdong province to practice another traditional
Chinese custom: drowning unwanted female babies at birth.
Hennessy was initially sympathetic to Smale’s cause, but this
delegation of Chinese ‘gentlemen’ eventually convinced him that
kidnapping must be distinguished from the legitimate selling and
buying of boys for adoption and girls as domestic servants. Thus, in
1880 Hennessy approved the establishment of the Po Leung Kuk
(Society for the Protection of Women and Children). After a series of
local studies on whether the mui-tsai system constituted slavery, the
matter went to theBritishHouse of Lords, where it was agreed that the
Hong Kong government should not interfere with customs which were
so deeply ingrained in Chinese society. The Colonial Office eventually
decided that ensuring themui-tsaiwere not being sold into prostitution
would be sufficient, passing an ordinance to this effect in 1887, the
Ordinance for the Better Protection of Women and Children.
The mui-tsai controversy, which would be revived in the 1920s and
1930s, is reminiscent of similar issues in other European colonies:
imperial ordinances towards local customs and legal traditions; the
relationship between law, nationhood and gender; and patriarchal
attitudes towards social welfare. As it would be in the early twentieth
century, the controversy was also embroiled in long-standing debates
about prostitution and venereal diseases, two problems that had drawn
embarrassing and unwanted attention to Hong Kong since its early
days as a British Crown colony. Whereas the mui-tsai controversy has
been studied mainly for how it led to the founding of the Po Leung
Papers, China, 26; Correspondence, Annual Reports, Conventions, and Other Papers Relating to
the Affairs of Hong Kong, 1882–1899 (hereafter BPP) (Shannon, 1971), 169.
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Kuk,3 this article frames the debate within differing conceptions of
what kind of place Hong Kong had become by the late 1870s, and
what kind of place it could and should become. By adopting a mainly
chronological narrative and frequently retaining the original wording,
I hope to capture both the character of the debate and the passions
that it invoked.
The mui-tsai debate arose from different attitudes towards Hong
Kong’s geographic, political and cultural position at the edge of
the British and the Chinese empires. The debate also showed that
colonialists disagreed so often and so vehemently that it sometimes
makes little sense to talk about ‘colonial discourse’ or ‘the colonial
mind’ – terms that have been thrown about so carelessly that they
frequently lack any serious analytical or explanatory value. For John
Smale, who several years earlier had condemned theChinese ‘coolie’ or
emigrant trade as a formof slave trade and in 1867had even suggested
that Chinese emigration through Hong Kong should be abolished
entirely in order to end abuses, and who while on home leave in the
spring of 1878 had been thanked by the Society for the Protection
of Aborigines for helping to curb the oppression of the emigrant
trade, the issue was a national shame that challenged Britain’s
commitment to ending slavery throughout its empire. For the liberal,
reform-minded John Hennessy, the mui-tsai problem exemplified both
what was wrong with Hong Kong and what, with the help of the
rising Chinese merchant elite, the colony could become.4 Hennessy
saw the mui-tsai, and any trafficking in humans, as an abomination
that could nevertheless be resolved by the Chinese elites. Although
Smale had declared all such arrangements illegal and ordered the
courts to prosecute, on 10 October Hennessy ordered that no action
be taken until the colonial secretary in London weighed in on the
matter. For E. J. Eitel, missionary, sinologist, inspector of schools
and Hennessy’s private ‘Chinese’ secretary, the mui-tsai system was
grounded in ancient, ingrained forms of Chinese ‘patriarchicalism’
3 For example, Henry J. Lethbridge, “Evolution of a Chinese Voluntary Association
in Hong Kong: The Po Leung Kuk,” in Hong Kong: Stability and Change: A Collection of
Essays (Hong Kong, 1978), 71–103; Elizabeth Sinn, “Chinese Patriarchy and the
Protection of Women in 19th-century Hong Kong,” in Maria Jaschok and Suzanne
Miers (eds.),Women and Chinese Patriarchy: Submission, Servitude, and Escape (Hong Kong,
1994), 141–170.
4 Kate Lowe and Eugene McLaughlin, “Sir John Pope Hennessy and the ‘Native
Race Craze’: Colonial Government in Hong Kong, 1877–1882,” Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 20 (1992), 223–241.
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that would eventually dissolve as China modernized.5 Complicating
any facile notions about the power of the colonial state, the debate also
showed the rise of a class of Chinese elites, such as the comprador Fung
Ming-shan (FengMingshan), who had accumulated enough power and
influence to defend the mui-tsai system as a time-honoured, national
Chinese custom, even while in colonial Hong Kong they lived beyond
the reach of Chinese sovereignty.
The Mui-Tsai System and the Growth in Kidnapping and
Trafficking in Humans
Many of the girls and women in late-nineteenth-century Hong Kong
were mui-tsai, ‘younger sisters’ who had been sold as bondservants
to wealthier families, often through an intermediary known as a
‘pocket mother’. Found throughout China under a variety of names,
this arrangement helped poor families find better homes for their
daughters while providing domestic help for wealthier families. Given
the emphasis in China on having sons to carry on the family name,
there was never a shortage of unwanted girls. As Western ‘China
experts’ such as James Dyer Ball and Arthur Smith often noted, the
mui-tsai system was especially prevalent in South China, ravaged by
the economic and social disruption caused by the Opium Wars and
the Taiping Rebellion, and by clan feuds, Hakka-Punti conflicts, and
triad uprisings.6
The first ordinance of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, the Slavery
Ordinance (No. 1 of 1844), banned slavery (although the ordinance
was later disallowed because British law already banned slavery), but
neither the colonial government nor the majority of the Chinese
population considered this to include the mui-tsai system. Despite
sporadic criticism, mainly from European missionaries in Hong Kong
and officials in Britain, the legal status of the system did not come
into question until the late 1870s. Even then, most colonial officials
believed that the mui-tsai system did not violate British laws against
slavery. Ruling on a case where aman had sold his daughter to another
man who was planning to take the girl out of Hong Kong, in May
5 For Eitel’s summary of the mui-tsai controversy, see Europe in China: The History
of Hong Kong from the Beginning to the Year 1882 (1895; reprint, Hong Kong, 1983),
546–548.
6 Lethbridge, ‘Chinese Voluntary Association,” 74–75.
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1878AttorneyGeneral George Phillippo wrote that such a transaction
‘would not be recognised in our laws as giving any rights except perhaps
as to guardianship, but I am unable to say that there is anything illegal
in the matter beyond that. I do not think it is a criminal offence if it
goes no further than the adoption of a child and the payment to its
parents for the privilege’.7
The reason why themui-tsai issue became so controversial in the late
1870s had as much to do with timing as with the practice itself. An
extensive network of kidnapping had developed to feed the need for
prostitutes and servants in Hong Kong. Given the extent of poverty
in Guangdong, it was hardly surprising that girls and young women
were often kidnapped from their native villages and then sold as
prostitutes or servants in Hong Kong. With the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1870, the colony was becoming a popular destination for
European and American tourists (former American president Ulysses
Grant came in 1879 as part of his widely publicized world cruise),
many of whom were shocked that such a practice could be tolerated
in a British colony. The peripatetic Isabella Bird, who visited Hong
Kong in 1879, described the mui-tsai system as a ‘peculiar hateful
form of slavery which is recognised by Chinese custom, and which
has attained gigantic proportions in Victoria’.8 The issue had also
attracted the concern of reformist groups in Britain, such as the Anti-
Slavery Society, the Social Science Association and the Society for the
Protection of Aborigines. Most important for the way the debate was
resolved, local Chinese elites had become strong enough to protect
a traditional Chinese custom in which they participated actively and
from which they benefitted greatly.
Smale’s Attack
Although there was never one single opinion representing either
the Chinese or the European community, or even among the
colonial government, many people in Hong Kong felt that Smale
had unnecessarily condemned a perfectly acceptable Chinese custom.
Further complicating matters was the ambiguous status of the
mui-tsai within her adoptive household – half-servant, half-family
member – with some mui-tsai even eventually becoming concubines
7 Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23 January 1880, BPP, 167.
8 Isabella L. Bird, The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither (London, 1883), 41.
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and inheriting their husbands’ wealth. And one of the cardinal
rules of British colonial administration was that tampering too
much with native customs could be dangerous. Whereas critics
considered the mui-tsai system a form of slavery that often encouraged
sexual abuse, defenders insisted that the girls were treated as
family members and that the system saved girls from prostitution.
Smale’s support for Hennessy’s ‘pro-Chinese’ policy, which alienated
the local European community, won him little support from that
quarter, while his eccentric and often acerbic personality did little
to help his case. According to colonial official James Norton-Kyshe,
Smale, who had arrived in Hong Kong in 1861 as attorney general,
‘had frequent differences with the officers of the Court’ and ‘was
somewhat lacking in the qualities necessary to maintain the dignity
of his high office’.9 As a result of Smale’s ‘singularly impulsive and
energetic’ temperament, Norton-Kyshe reported, ‘from time to time
objectionable and occasionally disgraceful scenes were presented in
Court’.10 E. J. Eitel later wrote that Smale’s ‘unseemly disputes’ in
the late 1860s with the popular senior Queen’s counsel, E. H. Pollard,
‘frequently disfigured’ the administration of justice’.11 Although in
March 1874 Smale became the first chief justice of Hong Kong to be
knighted, the local European community took advantage of his absence
during home leave in the spring of 1878 ‘to urge his retirement from
the service’.12
Far from retiring, Smale returned to Hong Kong recharged with
reformist zeal. In his declaration from the bench on 6 October
1879, he vehemently disagreed that selling and buying children was
not a criminal offence. Nor did he believe that the mui-tsai had
any grounding in Chinese law: a system that was illegal in China
was not only tolerated but even protected in a British colony. The
reported frequent appearance of placards offering rewards for lost girls
provided ‘more palpable, more public evidence of generally recognised
slavery’ in Hong Kong than in Cuba and Peru, those two ‘hotbeds of
slavery’.13 Especially embarrassing for a nation that prided itself on
having abolished slavery throughout its empire and had attempted to
persuade other European nations to do the same, the mui-tsai system
9 James William Norton-Kyshe, The History of Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, vol. 2
(Hong Kong, 1898), 358.
10 Norton-Kyshe, Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, 358–359.
11 Eitel, Europe in China, 445.
12 Norton-Kyshe, Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, 275.
13 Smale’s declaration, 6 October 1879, BPP, 169.
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was becoming even more prevalent as Hong Kong attracted more of
what colonial officials often called ‘the better class of Chinese’ from
the mainland. In a letter to Hennessy on 20 October 1879, Smale
estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 girls and women were
enslaved in Hong Kong, either as mui-tsai or as prostitutes: ‘The more
I penetrate below the polished surface of our civilization, the more
convinced am I that the broad under-current of life here is more like
that in the Southern States of America when slavery was dominant,
than it resembles the all-pervading civilization of England’.14
Smale’s criticism of the mui-tsai system reflected an old concern that
colonial Hong Kongmust become the ‘right’ kind of place. The British
vision of early colonialHongKongwas frequently called ‘Anglo-China’,
which according to Christopher Munn meant ‘a model of British good
government, a living exhibition of European civilization, a meeting
point between east and west, where the manners, institutions and
technologies of both cultures would engage each other in a productive
and beneficial way’.15 This vision had taken several fitful decades to
materialize. One reason was because the colonial government could
not provide a secure business environment. The new wealth in Hong
Kong (especially compared with the poverty in the surrounding areas
on the mainland), the easy access from China and the large number
of European adventurers all led to crime on land and piracy in the
surrounding waters. The colonial government was also initially unable
to obtain reliable help from the local Chinese leadership, not the least
because the indigenous Chinese population had been quickly overrun
and bewildered by the new immigrants from the mainland.
By the late 1870s, however, the establishment of voluntary
organizations such as the District Watch Force (1866), the Nam Pak
Hong Kung So (1868) and the Tung Wah Hospital (1869) seemed
to represent an expansion of Chinese participation in the local public
sphere, demonstrating the community spirit, urban consciousness and
commitment to collective civic betterment that colonial officials hoped
to draw from their Chinese subjects. Yet the vision of Anglo-China
remained cloudy. Because the overwhelming majority of Chinese and
Europeans who came after the British occupation were male, the
gender balance of Hong Kong’s population had always been heavily
14 Smale to Hennessy, 20 October 1879, enclosed in Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23
January 1880, BPP, 177.
15 ChristopherMunn,Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule inHong Kong, 1841–
1880 (Richmond, Surrey, 2001), 9.
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skewed (the large British and Indian military presence only made
the imbalance worse). With housing costs being so much higher than
in Guangdong and with Hong Kong’s reputation for crime, opium
and gambling, most wealthy Chinese merchants kept their families
in Guangdong. Hong Kong quickly gained notoriety as a centre for
prostitution and venereal disease. Although the influx of Chinese in
the 1850s and 1860s during the Taiping Rebellion had brought more
‘respectable’ Chinese women, according to the first proper census,
in 1872, the ratio of Chinese men to women was still 7 to 1 (the
European ratio was 5 to 1). According to the 1876 census, five-sixths
of the almost 25,000 Chinese women in Hong Kong were prostitutes.
In 1877, the police magistrate estimated that only one out of every
six Chinese women in Hong Kong were either married or concubines,
the rest being prostitutes. This assumption that Chinese women who
were either not married or concubines must necessarily have been
prostitutes says more about European attitudes towards the Chinese
community than about the actual number of prostitutes. It does not,
however, counter the fact that Hong Kong had become known as a
centre for prostitution and venereal disease, especially syphilis.
Ironically, then, just as Hong Kong appeared to be fulfilling one part
of that cherished vision of Anglo-China and was no longer simply a
minor colonial outpost and an opium centre, it was becoming a bastion
of prostitution, kidnapping and what John Smale and other opponents
of the mui-tsai system called ‘domestic slavery’. Furthermore, the
very fact that more ‘respectable’ Chinese women were coming to
Hong Kong was partly responsible for the growth of the mui-tsai
system. As Geoffrey Sayer, early historian of Hong Kong, noted,
more Chinese women were gradually coming to the colony, ‘bringing
with them that domestic atmosphere the lack of which accounted
more than all else for the rowdyism and laxity of morals of the
place’. But this was a mixed blessing, for ‘as the housewives came
to Hong Kong, the “little sisters” or mui-tsai came too’.16 Smale,
too, realized that the prevalence of the mui-tsai system was due to
the expanding Chinese population of Hong Kong, but whereas other
colonial officials saw value in this larger Chinese population, Smale
saw also decadence and dissolution. ‘The number of Chinamen in this
Colony has increased and is increasing rapidly’, he argued, ‘whilst
the great increase in wealth has fostered licentious habits, notably
16 G. R. Sayer,HongKong,1862–1919: Years of Discretion (HongKong, 1975), 43–44.
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in buying women for purposes sanctioned neither by the laws nor
customs on the mainland’.17 Smale insisted that the mui-tsai system
could not be distinguished from kidnapping and sale and purchase
of girls and young women for brothel slavery: ‘all slavery, domestic,
agrarian, or for immoral purposes, comes within one and the same
category’.18 Smale also rejected any possible parallels between themui-
tsai and the common apprenticeship system in England. Furthermore,
he disagreed on both historical and legal grounds that the mui-tsai
custom was protected by the 1841 proclamations, mainly because
Hong Kong at that time would not have had enough wealthy Chinese
who could have owned mui-tsai.19
The 1878 Chinese Petition
That they would find themselves arguing against John Smale must
have come as a surprise to the Chinese merchants, for the chief
justice had established a reputation as a champion of Hong Kong’s
non-European residents. In April 1865, he received an address and a
silver plate from the Parsee and Indian Muslim communities. When
Smale created a controversy in 1871 by finding Kwok Asing, a Chinese
emigrant, innocent of murder and piracy, on the grounds that Kwok
had the right to free himself – even if itmeant killing the officers on the
kidnapping ship – he enjoyed the support of the Tung Wah Hospital,
the most powerful Chinese organization in Hong Kong.20 Chinese
leaders were similarly gratified when in 1873 and 1875 the colonial
government obliged their requests to pass a law against kidnapping
and trafficking in coolies and women for prostitution. During the
tenure of Richard MacDonnell, who tried harder than any governor to
control Hong Kong’s Chinese population, by expanding the powers of
the police and by increasing the use of flogging, hanging, branding and
deportation, Smale criticized the police for conducting slow enquiries
in which innocent people were wrongfully detained for long periods.21
But these Chinese leaders were shocked to discover that the 1875 law
17 Smale’s declaration, 6 October 1879, BPP, 169.
18 Smale’s declaration, 6 October 1879, BPP, 170.
19 Smale’s declaration, 6 October 1879, BPP, 172.
20 Sinn, “Chinese Patriarchy,” 143; see also Sinn, Power and Charity: The Early History
of the Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1989), 103, 114.
21 G. B. Endacott, “A Hong Kong History: Europe in China, by E. J. Eitel: The Man
and the Book,” Journal of Oriental Studies 4 (1957/1958), 154.
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did not simply prohibit kidnapping and buying and selling coolies and
women for prostitution: it prohibited any kind of sale and purchase
of human beings. After Phillippo’s ruling in May 1878 that selling
and buying children for adoption did not constitute slavery, in early
November of that year, four prominent Chinese merchants asked
Hennessy for permission to forman association to suppress kidnapping
and trafficking in humans. In a memorial signed by 62 Chinese shops,
Lo Lai-p’ing (Lu Liping), Shi Shang-kai (Shi Shengjie), Tse Tat-shing
(XieDacheng) and FungMing-shan (co-founder of the NamPakHong
Kung So) explained why kidnapping had become so widespread:
[Q]uite lately the minds of some people have become perverted in deceit,
pretending to obey the law and secretly disobeying it, pursuing a dangerous
secret game, and moving about between east and west, the worst being go-
betweens and old women who have houses for the detention of kidnapped
people, and, as it may be, inveigle virtuous women or girls to come to Hong
Kong, at first deceiving them by the promise of finding them employment (as
domestic servants), and then proceeding to compel them by force to become
prostitutes, or exporting them to a foreign port, or distribute them by sale
over the different ports of China, boys being sold to become adopted children,
girls being sold to be trained for prostitution, it being altogether impossible
to explain in detail all their varied plans of wickedness.22
Such ‘wicked people’ were to be found in all of the neighbouring
Chinese districts and counties, but the kidnapping of children had
become especially common in Dongguan, the four merchants’ native
district in Guangdong.23 Thus, thememorialists requested permission
to form a society to ‘facilitate general publication of offers of reward,
and the employment of special detectives with a view to eventually
stamp out this crime of kidnapping, and to make it impossible for the
kidnappers to carry on their tricks’.24
The Chinese merchants faced a dilemma: they needed to show that
the mui-tsai system should be allowed to continue as a legitimate
Chinese custom, but they also needed to show that there was nothing
particularly Chinese about kidnapping. In their enclosure in the
memorial, they explained that although kidnapping was ‘a crime to
22 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, enclosed in Hennessy to
Hicks Beach, 23 January 1880, BPP, 190.
23 Lethbridge, “Chinese Voluntary Association,” 80–81, states that a combination
of several factors made kidnapping especially severe in Dongguan: disruption from
triad activities, the OpiumWars and civil strife, as well as the district’s role as a base
for Chinese emigration and its easy access to the Pearl and East rivers.
24 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, BPP, 190.
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be found anywhere’, there was ‘no place’ where it was ‘more rife’ than
in Hong Kong. Nor had there ever been a time ‘when it developed so
rapidly as of late’. With conditions so ripe, ‘evil-disposed persons had
an opportunity to set their wicked plans for inveigling and kidnapping
people in operation. Ignorantwomen fell an easy prey to their schemes.
If once they entered the trap there were but few who could extricate
themselves again’. Downplaying the ‘Chineseness’ of kidnapping and
trafficking in human beings, the memorialists described how Hong
Kong’s geographic and political situation facilitated these ‘wicked
plans’. As the ‘emporium and thoroughfare for all the neighbouring
ports’, Hong Kong had become ‘a place where it is easy to buy and to
sell, and where effective means are at hand to make good a speedy
escape’. Furthermore, the kidnappers were taking advantage of Hong
Kong’s easy English justice: ‘the laws of Hong Kong being based on
the principle of liberty of the person, the kidnappers take advantage
of this to further their own plans . . . Even if they are confronted with
witnesses it is difficult to show up their wicked game’. Noticing that
kidnapping had increased and that both kidnappers and victims were
generally from Dongguan, the memorialists found it ‘unbearable to
think that these villains take this hospitable Colony for a convenient
refuge’.25
By asking for permission to form a society to stop kidnapping, the
memorialists were trying to distinguish between kidnapping and the
mui-tsai system, thus attempting to preserve a custom in which they
were so heavily invested.26 As Elizabeth Sinn has argued, enforcing
the law against human trafficking would have done more than end
the mui-tsai and brothel systems: it would have also affected the
practice of concubinage. Thus it would have ‘eroded the very basis
of Chinese patriarchy’.27 But the memorial was also a declaration that
theChinese elites had the wherewithal to handle the situation on their
own. They proposed to ‘publish everywhere offers of reward to track
such kidnappers and have them arrested’.28 Because the memorialists
all hailed fromDongguan, they could ‘get comparatively more reliable
information’ about the kidnappers, ‘leaving no room formiscarriage of
25 Enclosure in memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, translated by
E. J. Eitel and enclosed in Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23 January 1880, BPP, 191.
26 Lethbridge, “Chinese Voluntary Association,” 8; Sinn, “Chinese Patriarchy,”
144.
27 Sinn, “Chinese Patriarchy,” 163.
28 Enclosure in memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, BPP, 191.
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justice’.29 They would hireDongguan ‘natives’ to track the kidnappers,
and ‘although their wicked schemes are very deep, yet they will find it
difficult to escape a careful search’.30 The memorialists also realized
that in a British colony their proposal might ‘be an interference with
official regulations’. Revealing how well they had learned to operate
within Hong Kong’s colonial situation, they insisted that they ‘dare
not proceed in thematter without a warrant’ from the governor.31 The
benefits of their plan would be manifold: ‘honest people will be saved
from ruin, and kidnappers will be unable to carry out their schemes
at random; thus our native city will be benefitted, and Hong Kong
will be [sic] derive equal advantage’. Not only would the plan help
to end kidnapping, it would also bring credit to Hennessy: ‘the grace
and favour of His Excellency the Governor will not only put under
obligation the people of Hong Kong, but all the poor people of the
inland districts will, with one voice, praise his goodness’.32
The 1879 Chinese Petition
What alarmed the Chinese elites so much about Smale’s declaration
was not only that he was ruling the mui-tsai system a criminal offence;
he was also demanding that the colonial government prosecute the
practice. In his conclusion Smale affirmed that ‘to sell or to buy or to
hold or detain a man, a woman, or a child as a slave or as property
is absolutely prohibited by the law of England, which law is imported
into and forms the substance of the law of Hong Kong’. Because the
29 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, BPP, 190.
30 Enclosure in memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, BPP, 191.
31 Enclosure in memorial of Chinese merchants, 9November 1878, BPP, 190–191.
In February 1860 a prominent Chinese merchant named Tam Achoy and five other
local Chinese had learned the perils of carrying out such vigilante activities. After
chartering a steamer, fitting it with guns, and hiring English sailors to attack “a
tribe of Hakkas who had forcibly taken possession” of Tam’s village in Guangdong
and “were committing great ravages throughout the neighbouring country,” the six
were charged in Hong Kong with piracy and organizing “a hostile expedition against
subjects of the Emperor of China.” Insisting that they had acted in response to a
Chinese official’s request and were unaware of breaking any law, all six pleaded
guilty, put themselves at the mercy of the court, and received a reprimand. Great
Britain, Colonial Office, Original Correspondence: Hong Kong, 1841–1951, Series
129 (CO129), Public RecordOffice, London, “Notes byW.H. Adams, Chief Justice on
the Tam Achoy filibuster case,” enclosed in CO 129/78, 21 February 1860, 191–197,
and CO 129/78, 24 August 1860, 187–190.
32 Enclosure in memorial of Chinese merchants, 9 November 1878, BPP, 191.
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system was ‘contrary to the public morals which form a part of that
law’, it ‘ought to be put down’. Given Hennessy’s commitment to
fighting the abuses of the Chinese emigrant trade, Smale felt assured
that because of ‘his previous acts’ Hennessy would ‘actively promote
all such proceedings as will tend to enforce the laws against slavery
here, so that this Colony may become as free from that taint as any
other Colony under the British Crown, by enforcing laws already in
existence, and, if necessary, by passing laws, however stringent, that
shall free this Colony effectually from all slavery’.33
This explains the speed and alacrity with which the Chinese
merchants responded to Smale’s declaration. On 22 October 1879 a
group of Chinese merchants, ‘on behalf of the Chinese community of
HongKong’, sent a second petition toHennessy, asking him to ‘stretch
such a point of law, and to apply it with discrimination, so as to yield to
the feelings of the people, and to extend compassionate consideration
to their views’.34 Whereas in 1878 the Chinese merchants had merely
tried to obtain approval for their anti-kidnapping society, now they
tried to prevent the government from banning the practice of selling
daughters and adopting out sons. In their introduction, the petitioners
explained that because the Chinese government had never prohibited
Chinese from selling daughters and adopting out sons ‘to save their
own lives (from starvation)’, the practice had continued ‘for a long
time without interference’. But recently this practice had become
confused with buying girls as domestic servants and then selling them
into prostitution, ‘such confusion of stones with pearls being a matter
for extreme regret’. However, the petitioners insisted that buying
boys for adoption and girls for ‘domestic servitude’ tended to ‘widely
differ’ from the ‘wicked’ kidnapping that had become so widespread,
‘because the purchasing of boys has its reason in the absence of male
descendants creating a desire to adopt a son, as the sphex adopts
the mulberry insect, whilst the buying of girls has its origin in the
necessity for a division of labour caused by the multifarious character
of domestic duties’. The girls were not abused; rather, they required
‘both to be taught and to be tended’ and were given in marriage (to
33 Smale’s declaration, 6 October 1879, BPP, 172–173.
34 Petitioners listed as Chiu U-t’in (Zhao Yutian), Wong K’wan-t’ong (Wang
Juntang), Leung On (Liang An), Kwok Ts’ung, Fung Ming-shan, Wong Shu¨-t’ong
(Huang Shutang), Fung Tang (Feng Deng), Leung Lu¨n-po (Liang Luanbo), Ch’an
Cheuk-chi (Chen Zhuozhi), Fung Yin-t’ing (Feng Yanting), Ts’ui Sui-chang (Cui
Ruisheng), P’ang Yat-p’o (Pang Yipu), U Ho-ts’un, Kwok Nam-p’ing (Guo Nanping),
et al.
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free men), ‘whilst all along they are allowed to take their ease and
have no hard work to do’.35
After noting how Elliot’s proclamation of 1841, which promised that
Chinese in Hong Kong would be treated according to Chinese custom,
had attracted theChinesewho helpedmakeHongKong so prosperous,
the Chinese merchants explained that all previous governors ‘were
fully aware of these social customs of the Chinese people, and never
insisted upon the law being set in motion against them, but treated
the matter with indulgence, and forbore prosecution’. But now Smale
wanted to make buying and selling girls even for domestic servitude
an offence. This had ‘put all native residents of Hong Kong in a state
of extreme fear’: merchants feared they could be found guilty of a
statutory offence, while ‘the poor and low class people’ feared ‘being
deprived of a means to preserve their lives’. If the practice were to
be ‘entirely forbidden’, female infanticide would increase and people
‘thus deprived of a means to keep off starvation’ would ‘drift into
thiefdom and brigandage’. The petitioners hoped that Hennessy, with
his habit ‘of solicitude for the sufferings of the people, and of sympathy
with their feelings’, would ‘surely not allow poor people who have no
helper to be left awaiting death with tied hands’, and would not make
the practice a criminal offence.36
In the text of their petition, the Chinese merchants established
that buying and selling children in China had existed since ‘time
immemorial’ and, because of the ‘excessive increase of the population,
and the wide extent of poverty and distress’, was found among both
‘common people’ and ‘families of scholars and high officials’. The
Chinese government had always tolerated this practice; otherwise,
‘poor and distressed people would have no means left to save their
lives, but would be compelled to sit down and wait for death’. This
must be distinguished from kidnapping, which in China was punished
‘with severity, the worst cases being visited with capital punishment’.
Reminding Hennessy again that Elliot’s proclamation had attracted
enough Chinese to make Hong Kong prosperous, the petitioners
explained that Chinese had come to Hong Kong ‘supposing that
they would be able to live here in peace, and to rejoice in their
property’. Some ‘native residents’ had even recently ‘expressed a wish
for naturalisation’, while other ‘native merchants felt a desire to settle
35 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 22 October 1879, translated by E. J. Eitel and
enclosed in Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23 January 1880, BPP, 208–209.
36 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 22 October 1879, BPP, 208–209.
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down in this trading place’. But now, ‘all of a sudden’, the law was to
be changed. Not only was this ‘a violation of the rule of Sir John [sic]
Elliot’, it would ‘not fail to trouble the people’.37
It was in this petition that the Chinese merchants used the threat of
oneChinese custom to justify the continuation of another. Banning the
selling of girls and adoption of boys in Hong Kong would encourage
the ‘evil’ practice of infanticide, which was ‘especially followed’ in
neighbouring Guangdong (though it had ‘lately abated to a certain
extent’). ‘Poor and indigent people, scarcely able to provide food and
clothes for themselves, finding themselves additionally burdened with
the anxieties and troubles which children involve, will frequently, if
unable to find anybody willing to take over and rear them, proceed
to drown them the moment they are born’. Although this ‘cruel and
unnatural proceeding’ was ‘unanimously abhorred by everyone’, it was
‘caused by the pressure of poverty and distress’ and thus ‘must be
classified with evils which are almost unavoidable’. The petitioners
posed infanticide as a stark but preventable alternative to selling
or adopting children. ‘The heinousness of the violation of the great
Creator’s benevolence’ was ‘beyond comparison with the indulgence
granted to the system of buying and selling children to prolong their
existence’. Because the adopting families had ‘an abundance of clothes
and food, which certainly offers an advantage beyond anything those
children had in their own families’, people tended to ‘rather rejoice
over the fact that these children change hands’. And since parents
who sold their children did so only as a last resort, the arrangement
was ‘entirely voluntary’ and without the ‘least compulsion’. Buyers saw
themselves as ‘affording relief to distressed people’, considering the
matter ‘as an act akin to charity’. Not only did the children have to be
clothed, fed, taught and provided with medical care when necessary,
they had to be chosen suitable husbands or wives once they were old
enough. ‘The love and care devoted to them is often greater than that
bestowed on one’s own offspring’. Thus, the petitioners insisted, it was
impossible to ‘class this system as identical with life-long slavery and
deprivation of liberty’.38
Whereas Smale had gendered the sale and purchase of children by
focusing on the mui-tsai, Chinese merchants de-gendered the issue
by placing it into the larger context of selling and buying girls
and adopting boys, both of which they claimed were time-honoured
37 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 22 October 1879, BPP, 209–210.
38 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 22 October 1879, BPP, 210–211.
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Chinese customs. Because having a son to carry on the family namewas
the most important of the Confucian tenets, many people were willing
to buy boys. And the selling and buying of girls and life-long slavery
were ‘as different heaven and earth’. The petitioners had already asked
the government for permission to form a society to protect women
and children from kidnapping. This proved that they ‘hate that form
of wickedness as one hates one’s enemy, and cannot bear seeing this
class of rogues and vagabonds at liberty to play their pranks in this
humanely governed English Colony’. Everyone knew that the majority
of women in brothels had been purchased, yet the government had
never tried to prohibit this, mainly because the colonial registrar
generals, ‘who were thoroughly acquainted with Chinese social
customs, abstained from such grievous measures’. Because the mui-
tsai enjoyed food and clothing that were ‘far superior’ to what they
had received in their own families, girls from ‘poor and distressed’
families considered the mui-tsai system to be ‘the very heaven and
highroad to fortune’. Any effort to end the system would only ‘be
to their injury’. Instead, the petitioners suggest that the colonial
government subject the buying and selling of boys and girls to official
regulation.39
Unconvinced, on 27 October 1879 Smale sent Hennessy his own
comments on the Chinese petition. Smale found the petitioners’
statements ‘one-sided and coloured, but, on the whole, more fair than
is usual with persons who believe they are representing grievances’.40
The petitioners had cited Elliot’s proclamation that Chinese in
Hong Kong would be allowed to keep their customs, but they had
ignored the proclamations of 1841 and 1845 prohibiting slavery.
Smale also disagreed that the mui-tsai could be considered a Chinese
custom that, if ended, would force poor Chinese to revert to another
Chinese custom, drowning their children. By calling female infanticide
a Chinese custom, the petitioners were in effect claiming that it
was ‘free from criminality in Hong Kong’. Yet, Smale argued, if
anyone in Hong Kong was convicted of infanticide, ‘Chinese custom
would be no protection’ and the perpetrator would be sentenced to
death.41
39 Memorial of Chinese merchants, 22 October 1879, BPP, 211–212.
40 Smale’s declaration, 27October 1879, enclosed in Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23
January 1880, BPP, 176.
41 Smale’s declaration, 27 October 1879, BPP, 176.
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Eitel’s Report
By now the debate had boiled down to two main questions: Was
the mui-tsai a form of slavery, and was it truly a Chinese ‘national’
custom?On25October1879, between theChinesemerchants’ second
petition and Smale’s response, E. J. Eitel, inspector of schools and
Hennessy’s personal ‘Chinese’ secretary, submitted a detailed, often
tedious report to Colonial Secretary W. H. Marsh.42 One of the rare
government officials in Hong Kong with a deep interest in Chinese
culture, Eitel had worked in China with the Basel Missionary Society
and subsequently with the London Missionary Society (LMS). He
moved toHongKong in1870 and in the same year completed hisHand-
Book for the Student of Chinese Buddhism, which earned him a doctoral
degree fromTubingenUniversity and is still regarded as an important
reference work.43 He also gave lectures at the City Hall on Chinese
Buddhism and on feng-shui (on which he published a book in 1873).44
At the invitation of Governor Arthur Kennedy, Eitel started working
for the colonial government in 1875 as director of Chinese studies
and chairman of the Schoolbook Committee. In 1879 he resigned
from the LMS to become inspector of schools and Hennessy’s personal
secretary.45
In his report, Eitel presented himself as one of those few Europeans
who truly understood China and its people, and what distinguished
Chinese society in Hong Kong from that on the mainland. He began
by reflecting how slavery had ‘happily become an impossibility among
the enlightened nations of the West’, where it had been ‘more or
less superseded by the contractual relation of master and servant’.
42 Eitel’s findings were later published as Correspondence Regarding the Alleged Existence
of Chinese Slavery in Hong Kong (London, 1882).
43 Hand-Book for the Student of Chinese Buddhism (Hong Kong, 1870). Later revisions
and expansions of this book include: Hand-Book for the Student of Chinese Buddhism: Its
Historical, Theoretical and Popular Aspects (Hong Kong, 1884) and Hand-Book of Chinese
Buddhism: Being a Sanskrit–Chinese Dictionary, with Vocabularies of Buddhist Terms in Pali,
Singhalese, Siamese, Burmese, Tibetan, Mongolian and Japanese (Hong Kong, 1888). Eitel
also compiled a Cantonese dictionary that was republished after his death as AChinese
Dictionary in the Cantonese Dialect (London and Hong Kong, 1877) and as A Chinese–
English Dictionary in the Cantonese Dialect (Hong Kong, 1910–1911).
44 Feng-Shui, or, The Rudiments of Natural Science in China (London, 1873).
45 This brief biography is based on Endacott, “Europe in China, by E. J. Eitel: The
Man and the Book,” 41–65; Henry J. Lethbridge’s introduction to the reprint of
Eitel’s Europe in China; and Wong Man-kong, “The Use of Sinology in the Nineteenth
Century: Two Perspectives Revealed in the History of Hong Kong,” in Lee Pui-tak
(ed.), Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China (Hong Kong, 2005), 135–154.
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Having thoroughly studied the role of slavery in Chinese society, he
concluded that the mui-tsai did not constitute any form of slavery as it
was known in the West. Because the term ‘slavery’ was ‘bound up with
the peculiar development of the social life and the legal theories of
the progressive societies of the West’, it could not be ‘rashly’ applied
to China, with its ‘entirely different history’ and social systems. For
China there was no room for the ‘absolute slavery’ that had for so long
‘disfigured Western civilization’. In China, the person did not exist as
a legal entity; rather, every family member, including servants and
slaves, ‘merges his or her individual existence in the “family”, which
is legally the only “person” existing in China’. Indeed, the Chinese
mind was unable to ‘comprehend any basis for individual relations
apart from the relations of the family’. Although no one in such a
family could be ‘free’, this ‘bondage’ was ‘not a mark of tyranny, but
of religious unity, a bond of equality and mutual regard’. Nor was the
‘family’ in China the same as in the West, for the ‘purchased slave,
the hired domestic, the wife’ were all ‘as truly related’ to the head of
such a family as his own son.46
In China, Eitel argued, slavery was not ‘an incident of race as in
the West, but an accident of misfortune’. And even though China had
a variety of persons who in the West would be considered slaves –
such as convicts, eunuchs and people who sold themselves or were
born in to hereditary slavery – Eitel was sure that there was ‘not
one such hereditary slave in Hong Kong’. In any case, he insisted that
domestic servitude was ‘entirely different’ from hereditary slavery.
Foreignerswould ‘of course’ find it ‘very unnatural that children should
be sold into domestic servitude’. But Chinese saw ‘nothing unnatural’
in the arrangement ‘because almost every social arrangement in
China – ‘betrothal, marriage, concubinage, adoption, servitude’ – was
‘professedly based on amoney bargain’. The ‘roots of this whole system
of slavery and servitude’ were ‘inseverably interlaced not only with
the general social organism but with the natural character of the
Chinese’.47 For Eitel, ‘the slavery and domestic servitude of China’
were institutions that could be eradicated by ‘nothing short of the
general dissolution of the whole social system of patriarchalism’, for
they were ‘ingrained in the very blood and brain of China’. Given
that English common law had ‘proved utterly inapplicable to the
46 Eitel’s report,25October1879, enclosed inHennessy toHicksBeach,23 January
1880, in Chinese Slavery, 51, BPP, 215.
47 Eitel’s report, 25 October 1879, BPP, 217–218; original emphasis.
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peculiar social systems of theChinese livinghere’, and that the colonial
government had never interfered with the most ‘prominent feature
of patriarchical society, that fountain source of female servitude,
polygamy’, Eitel felt it ‘inconsistent to single out the peculiar form
of legitimate female domestic servitude practised by the Chinese here
in accordance with the time-honoured custom of their native country,
the frontiers of which are conterminous with those of Hong Kong’.48
In Europe in China (1895), his history of Hong Kong, Eitel described
HongKong as ‘the inchoative union of Europe andChina’. The ‘mighty
spirit of free trade’ had ‘fused the interests of European and Chinese
merchants into indissoluble unity’.49 In 1879, this ‘inchoative union’
and ‘indissoluble unity’ had apparently yet to occur. For even though
Hong Kong was ‘indeed but a dot in the ocean’, its Chinese social life
was ‘also a dot in the ocean of that vast social life which covers a country
peopled by 400,000 of people’. Not having any ‘social intercourse with
the foreigners of Hong Kong, the pulse of Chinese social life in Hong
Kong beats in unison with that of patriarchical China, and its arteries
are constantly supplied with new life blood from the same source’.50
Like the Chinese merchants, Eitel warned that abolishing the mui-
tsai system would cause more harm than good. As a colonial official, he
also realized the impracticality of trying to prosecute such an ingrained
custom. After all, ‘modern sociology’ taught ‘that police prosecutions
or legislative enactments must of necessity prove inefficient when
intended to cope with any deep-seated social custom, because social
reforms cannot be effected by any means except by the accumulated
effects of habit on character’. As the situation currently stood, mui-
tsai in Hong Kong knew that they were free, and if ‘badly treated’
had ‘no hesitation in applying to the police, and bringing a charge of
assault against master or mistress’. If, however, the Hong Kong police
were to arrest every Chinese ‘house-father’ who possessed a mui-tsai,
these men would simply send their families back to the mainland.
Alternatively, if wealthy families were forced to give up their mui-tsai,
‘all worthless girls servant girls would be thrown upon the hands of
theGovernment’. Eitel could not imagine ‘what permanent good could
reasonably be expected to result from such direct interference’.51
48 Eitel’s report, 25 October 1879, BPP, 218–220.
49 Eitel, Europe in China, 165, 569–570.
50 Eitel’s report, 25 October 1879, BPP, 219–220.
51 Eitel’s report, 25 October 1879, BPP, 220.
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Eitel’s conclusions about the mui-tsai thus could not have been more
different from Smale’s. Whereas Smale had likened Hong Kong to the
American slave states, Eitel argued that ‘Chinese domestic servitude’
was ‘so peculiar’ and so different ‘in its essential characteristics
from negro slavery’, that it could not ‘be logically brought under the
provisions of any English enactment regarding that form of slavery’.
Chinese domestic servitude was ‘a low form of social development
when judged by the advanced standard of European civilization, but
when judged by the relative standard of Chinese civilization, founded
on entirely different principles’, it was ‘the best possible form of
social development under the circumstances. Absolute condemnation
of Chinese domestic servitude would therefore be an act of moral
injustice’. Chinese domestic servitude was ‘not an excresence on but a
necessary part of the patriarchical order of things’ that characterized
the ‘social life’ of Chinese in Hong Kong. Thus to ‘prohibit Chinese
domestic servitude in totowould therefore constitute an act of violence,
as striking at the very roots of the social organism, the results of which
would in all probability be harmful to the Chinese and embarrassing
to the government’. Although Chinese domestic servitude had been
‘hitherto upheld in Hong Kong by the conservative tendencies of the
patriarchical organism in China’, it was ‘bound by the laws of nature
to yield eventually to the progressive tendencies of modern society.
Undue interference with this process would therefore be an act of
injudicious intolerance’.52
The American Challenge
For John Smale, the existence and toleration of any practice that
resembled slaverywas an embarrassment, both toBritish justice and to
HongKong’s international image.His concernswerenot unwarranted.
On 30 April 1880, the British Foreign Office reported to the Colonial
Office that David Bailey, the American consul general at Shanghai,
had alleged on 22 October 1879 that slavery still existed in Hong
Kong. A Californian member of the House of Representatives had
used Bailey’s report to support restricting Chinese immigration to
the United States: If the British had been unable to prevent slavery
in Hong Kong, unlimited Chinese immigration to America would
52 Eitel’s report, 25 October 1879, BPP, 220–221.
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lead to the same kind of slavery practiced in Hong Kong. In his
report on slavery in China, Bailey cited Smale’s claim that there were
between 10,000 and 20,000 slaves in Hong Kong. Given that Hong
Kong’s Chinese population was 120,000, Bailey estimated ‘at least
one slave to every eleven freemen in that British colony in spite of
laws prohibiting slavery’. He concluded that ‘judging from the result
of thirty-seven years’ experience by the British authorities in Hong
Kong’, there was ‘vitality and strength enough in the Chinese family
law and in the system of Chinese slavery to enable them to defy foreign
laws and courts even in foreign countries’.53
Bailey was concerned about the implications of slavery in Hong
Kong for Chinese immigration to America, not about conditions in
Hong Kong per se, but his report showed how Smale’s declaration had
drawn unwanted attention to the mui-tsai issue. On 2December 1879,
Bailey forwarded toCharles Payson, third assistant secretary of state, a
collection of documents on slavery in Hong Kong: Smale’s declaration
that slavery had been allowed to exist in Hong Kong despite the
colonial government’s 1844 ordinance forbidding it; editorials on
Smale’s declaration from the Hong Kong Daily Press and the North
China Daily News based in Shanghai; a memorial from ‘more than
ten thousand of the Chinese gentry, merchants, and other people of
Hong Kong’ asking that British laws against slavery not be enforced in
Hong Kong (Bailey did not explain how he had obtained the number
‘ten thousand’); and an editorial from the Hong Kong Daily Press on
the Chinese petition. Whereas the Chinese petitioners had tried to
show that the mui-tsai system was not slavery, Bailey argued that the
petition and other documents were proof that ‘real slavery . . . prevails
in every part of the [Chinese] empire and among Chinese wherever
they go’. It was ‘significant’, noted Bailey, that colonial Hong Kong,
‘where it is now settled by a judicial decision of its Supreme Court, and
by admissions in solemn memorial of all the leading native residents,
that Chinese slavery exists and ever has existed as an essential feature
of the Chinese political and social system, is the entrepot for all the
Chinese emigration to the United States’.54
53 Bailey to Payson, 22October 1879, enclosed in ForeignOffice to Colonial Office,
30 April 1880, in Chinese Slavery, 57, BPP, 221.
54 Bailey to Payson, BPP, 234.
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The Colonial Office Steps In
News of Bailey’s report prompted the Colonial Office to pursue the
matter. On 20 May 1880 the Earl of Kimberly, secretary of state for
the colonies, wrote Hennessy about the issue of buying and selling
children. Regretting that ‘anything further’ had yet been done and ‘so
much valuable time’ had been lost regarding the Chinese petition of
1878 for a society to prevent kidnapping, Kimberly asked Hennessy to
‘at once thank theseChinese gentlemen for their offers of assistance in
repressing this form of crime’, and to allow them to ‘form themselves
into an association of whatever kind they desire’ – as long as the
association’s rules and organization were ‘made known and approved
by the Colonial Government’. Kimberly wanted to know if Hennessy
agreed with Eitel and theChinese petitioners that there was indeed no
connection between slavery and the adoption and domestic servitude
that Smale had decried, but which Eitel and the petitioners had
described as a Chinese tradition whereby the children were treated
better than had they ‘been left to their ordinary fate’. Did Hennessy
and Smale see these statements as ‘an accurate representation of the
facts connected with the adoption of children and domestic servitude
in Chinese families’?55
For Hennessy, who had commented on the mui-tsai system earlier in
1877 and 1878, the problem was part of the larger issue of giving local
Chinese elites a share in administering Hong Kong. On 23 January
1880, he explained to Colonial Secretary Michael Hicks Beach that
the ‘term slavery can hardly be applied in fairness to Chinese adoption
or to domestic service, where the individuals concerned go about our
streets with a knowledge that they are free; yet the fact that they have
actually been bought seems to me to condemn this system’. Hennessy
was ‘clearly of opinion that any practice involving a traffic in human
beings should be put down by law’. Unlike Smale, however, he felt that
the Chinese elites of Hong Kong could resolve the matter themselves:
‘Her Majesty’s Chinese subjects in this Colony are so loyal and law-
abiding a race that I anticipate no real difficulty in getting them to
assist the Government in putting a stop to this buying and selling of
children for adoption or domestic service’.56
55 Kimberly to Hennessy, 20 May 1880, in Chinese Slavery, 72, BPP, 236–
237.
56 Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23 January 1880, BPP, 168.
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As evidence that Chinese in Hong Kong were indeed capable
of playing such a role, Hennessy noted that in 1879 a ‘Chinese
gentleman’ had finally been appointed a justice of the peace. In 1880
the Chinese were at last represented in the Legislative Council, by
Ng Choy (better known in Chinese history as Wu Tingfang), the first
Chinese to be called to the English Bar. ‘As long as they were treated
as an alien race it is not surprising that they were allowed to keep up
practices alien to our constitution’. ForHennessy, giving theChinese a
greater role in local affairs was an integral part of making Hong Kong
a ‘flourishing Anglo-Chinese community’.57 Thus on 23 June 1880 he
replied to Kimberly that he had already let the ‘Chinese gentlemen’
form the Po Leung Kuk while awaiting the Colonial Office’s approval,
and that Ng Choy, acting police magistrate, was examining the rules
and organization of the society. (Hennessy did not, however, say what
he and Smale thought about the second Chinese petition or Eitel’s
report.)58
Smale, however, had little confidence in the colonial government,
let alone the Chinese elites, to resolve the situation. On 17 June
1880, after a Chinese was charged with kidnapping a 14-year-old girl
to sell her into prostitution, Smale complained that little was being
done to prevent girls from being sold into ‘domestic slavery’ (which
he differentiated from brothel slavery).59 But the matter was never
so simple. On 28 June, C. V. Creagh, acting police magistrate and
acting captain-superintendent of police, described the government’s
dilemma: Although Smale had declared all such arrangements illegal
and ordered the courts to prosecute, Hennessy had ordered that no
action be taken until the Colonial Office gave its opinion. Creagh
reported that although ‘contracts for the purchase or sale of human
beings’ were ‘of course invalid’ in Hong Kong, ‘it was not customary
for the police to prosecute or the magistrates to punish either parents
or legal guardians who, according to Chinese custom, sold their
children as servants or for adoption, or those who bought children
for either purpose from their guardians’. Not only was the practice
not prohibited by law, it was ‘generally regarded as beneficial to those
concerned, especially the children, who were rescued from destitution
57 Hennessy to Hicks Beach, 23 January 1880, BPP, 168.
58 Hennessy to Kimberly, 23 June 1880, in Chinese Slavery, 74–75, BPP, 238–239.
59 Smale to Stewart, 17 June 1880, enclosed inHennessy to Kimberly, 3 September
1880, in Chinese Slavery, 82–83, BPP, 246–247.
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and providedwith homes inwell-to-do families, without being deprived
in any degree of the protection of English law, which guarded them
against ill-treatment’.60
Similarly, on2 July1880NgChoy explained that under an ordinance
of 1875 the Hong Kong police actively intervened in cases where a
woman had been ‘decoyed into or out of the Colony for the purpose
of prostitution’. But cases where boys and girls were sold for ‘honest
purposes’ were more difficult. A mother ‘in distressed circumstances’
might sell her daughter but then make a false report that the girl
had been ‘forcibly detained’ in order to get her back. Even though
the girls often preferred to stay with the families who had bought
them, these families had no legal right over them. And if the police
interfered in cases where neither the girls nor their parents had filed
any complaint, the consequences could be ‘very serious’. Since most
of the girls’ parents were not in Hong Kong, the police would have to
find homes for them.61
Supporters of the sale and purchase of children had argued that
the system constituted adoption rather than slavery. Smale disagreed.
On 26 August 1880 he wrote the acting colonial secretary, Frederick
Stewart, stating that ‘in 99 cases out of every 100 cases’ adoption in
HongKongwould be illegal – not only under English law but also under
Chinese law, and that ‘if the status of owner and owned exist between
the parties, that is slavery’. By focusing only on the suppression of
kidnapping, the government had created an environment where ‘the
pauper kidnappers and sellers are punished while the rich buyers
go free’.62 On 24 November, Smale insisted to Stewart that ‘buying
and selling, even for adoption and domestic servitude under the best
circumstances, constitutes slavery; – legal according to Chinese law,
but illegal to British law’. As for the ‘Chinese gentlemen’ petitioners,
Smale believed that ‘not one of them’ kept his family in Hong Kong.
Rather, he kept his ‘small-footed’ wife at his family house in China,
keeping his ‘harem only’ in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the Chinese
merchants who had proposed a society to protect women and children
60 Report byCreagh,28 June1880, enclosed inHennessy toKimberly,3 September
1880, BPP, 248.
61 Minute by NgChoy, 2 July 1880, enclosed inHennessy to Kimberly, 3 September
1880, BPP, 248.
62 Smale to Stewart, 26 August 1880, enclosed in Hennessy to Kimberly, 4 August
1881, in Chinese Slavery, 94, BPP, 258–259.
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had ‘not shown their bona fides’, for ‘not a step’ had been taken to
form such an association.63
Nor was Smale convinced by the argument that these children were
‘far happier than if they had been left to their ordinary fate’. Had this
not been the same logic used by ‘the noble and the wealthy, the much
respected slave trader and holder, a century ago in England’? Even if
the girls were treatedwell, as theChinese gentlemenhad insisted, they
were nevertheless eventually sold as wives or concubines, ‘and form
a profitable investment to a Chinese gentleman’. The adopted boys
were ‘generally never’ able to redeem themselves from their contract.
And even if the children were purchased from their parents, it would
still be a misdemeanor under English law, ‘though the circumstances
may be such as to reduce the moral crime . . . to a minimum’. Smale
thus found his own conclusions to be ‘entirely inconsistent’ with the
views of Eitel and the ‘Chinese gentlemen’. He ended his letter to
Stewart by repeating that the ‘bona fides’ of the Chinese merchants
to form an association to suppress kidnapping had been ‘best tested’
by their ‘entire inaction ever since’ their request in 1878.64
On 15 June 1881, Hennessy reported to Kimberly that he was now
‘clearly of opinion that there is nothing illegal in the ordinary mode
of adoption of Chinese children in the colony’, and that the views of
Eitel and the Chinese petitioners on the practice were ‘correct’. He
declared that ‘no further change is needed in the executive machinery
now dealing with this matter; and that no alteration of the law on
this subject is required’.65 In a separate dispatch to Kimberly on the
same day, Hennessy reported that although the rules of the Society
for the Protection of Women and Children had not yet been finalized,
‘the Society works smoothly and is doing good’. The acting chief justice
who had replaced Smale had toldHennessy that the society had greatly
helped the government to detect kidnappers. Hennessy was convinced
that the society would ‘do more than anything else to put an end to
whatever was really bad in the native customs to which Sir John Smale
objected’.66
By this point, the debate was mainly between Smale and Eitel,
between the chief justice and the sinologist. On 15 July 1881, Smale
63 Smale to Stewart, 24 November 1880, enclosed in Hennessy to Kimberly, 4
August 1881, BPP, 261.
64 Smale to Stewart, 24 November 1880, BPP, 261–264.
65 Hennessy to Kimberly, 15 June 1881, in Chinese Slavery, 90, BPP, 254.
66 Hennessy to Kimberly, 15 June 1881, BPP, 256.
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offered a translated copy of bill of sale of a Chinese boy in June 1879
as proof of domestic slavery in Hong Kong.67 In his second report
on slavery, on 2 August 1881, however, Eitel argued that in Smale’s
reports ‘slavery’ had been ‘indiscriminately used, – now in a strictly
legal sense, and then again in its ethical or sentimental sense’. Eitel
also disagreed with Smale’s insistence that Chinese social life in Hong
Kong was ‘radically different’ from that in China, that the system
of adoption had no religious basis, that there was ‘relatively little
or no [Chinese] family life’ in Hong Kong, and that ‘not one of the
leading Chinese’ had his home in Hong Kong. These, Eitel insisted,
were ‘matters of which Sir John Smale could hardly be cognizant, as
they lie as much beyond his sphere of knowledge and experience as
English law lies beyond mine’. Eitel, after all, had spent the last 19
years observing suchmatters, and his claim that buying and selling for
legitimate domestic servitude and adoption was indeed an established
Chinese custom had been borne out in reports by the Chinese embassy
inLondonandbyAmericandiplomatic sources. Theperson fromwhom
Smale had received his information on Chinese customs, on the other
hand, was ‘a foreigner’ who was ‘ignorant of the written language
of China, but possessed of a smattering of the lowest slang of Hong
Kong’, and whose ‘knowledge of Chinese social life’ was ‘confined to an
intimate acquaintance with the lowest class of Chinese prostitutes’.
Eitel also disagreed that the Chinese petitioners had not ‘shown their
bona fides’ and had not done anything to form their association. If
Smale had taken ‘the trouble to inquire’, he would have found that
in most of the cases of kidnapping he tried ‘it was due to the efforts
of these very gentlemen that, in the first instance, the offenders were
brought to justice’.68 Eitel then listed 123 cases of kidnapping and
illegal sale of women or children that the society had dealt with from
15 January 1880 to the present. The ‘piles of correspondence’ between
the colonial secretary and the chairman of the Po Leung Kuk, testified
to the ‘immense activity of these gentlemen and their detectives’.69
67 Smale to Colonial Office, 15 July 1881, in Chinese Slavery, 89–90, BPP, 253–254.
68 Eitel’s report, 2August 1881, enclosed in Hennessy to Kimberly, 4August 1881,
in Chinese Slavery, 109, BPP, 273.
69 Eitel’s report, 2 August 1881, BPP, 274.
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Conclusions and Legacies
Especially compared to the fervent efforts to end the mui-tsai system
after World War I, the debate in the late 1870s and early 1880s was
short-lived and confined mainly within Hong Kong. On 31 August
1881, Hennessy forwarded to Kimberly a copy of the rules and
regulations of the Association for the Protection of Honest People,
along with suggestions for revisions by Attorney General Edward
O’Malley and the revised rules and regulations, including a new
English name: the Society for Protection of Women and Children. On
18March 1882, Kimberly gave Hennessy what would be the Colonial
Office’s final word on this debate. Hennessy had already indicated
that there was nothing illegal about the practice of adopting Chinese
children, and Kimberly was convinced that Hong Kong’s criminal
law was ‘not only strong enough to reach all ordinary cases of ill-
treatment, but that it affords special protection to women and girls’.
Furthermore, the fact that the law provided these women and girls
‘the same protection as to othermembers of the community’ was proof
that they were not slaves ‘in any technical sense’.70 Both Hennessy
and Smale left Hong Kong later in 1882. Hennessy, notes Sayer, ‘was
thus fortunate in escaping unscathed from a problem which was to
perplex and alarm subsequent administrations’.71 When Smale finally
leftHongKong on11April1881, a contemporary report noted that his
‘irascible temper and want of judicial dignity at times had done much
to render his final retirement a general relief’.72 He died in England
on 13August 1882, but not before lecturing on themany evils of Hong
Kong: brothels and contagious diseases, slavery and the opium trade.73
As Eitel, who remained in Hong Kong until 1897, when he retired to
Adelaide with his wife and four children, observed, ‘the brief turmoil
caused by the local slavery questions disappeared as quickly as it had
arisen’.74
Nor did the debate and the establishment of the Po Leung Kuk lead
to any significant changes in the mui-tsai system. In contrast, whereas
Hennessy had hoped that the Po Leung Kuk would eventually end the
mui-tsai system, some critics considered the society little more than
70 Kimberly to Hennessy, 18March 1882, in Chinese Slavery, 122, BPP, 286.
71 Sayer, Hong Kong, 44.
72 Norton-Kyshe, Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, 346.
73 Norton-Kyshe, Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, 347.
74 Eitel, Europe in China, 548.
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a scheme for ensuring that wealthy Chinese families always had a
steady supply of young servants and that well-to-do Chinese men had
a stocked pool of potential concubines. As Sinn argues, the Chinese
merchants’ ‘triumph had long-term consequences’. Despite its many
commendable activities, the Po Leung Kuk upheld a ‘peculiarly
Chinese form of patriarchy at a critical point of its development in
Hong Kong’. Once the controversy had subsided, ‘official inertia set
in again’ and the mui-tsai system was left ‘unquestioned’ until 1917.75
Henry Lethbridge saw the establishment of the PoLeungKuk ‘not only
as an example of commendable benevolence on the part of the affluent
but as an attempt tomaintainwithin aBritish colony aChinese custom
which had no basis in English law’. Ordinance No. 10 of 1893, which
incorporated the Po Leung Kuk, established a Permanent Board of
Directors and provided a government grant, was beneficial both to the
society and to the colonial government, for it made the government
look like ‘it was acting vigorously in curbing the traffic in human
beings’. Thus the Po Leung Kuk ‘helped, indirectly, to maintain in
servitude numbers of Chinese girls until long after the First World
War’.76 As Poon Pui Ting has argued, the mui-tsai controversy put the
Hong Kong government in an embarrassing predicament that it tried
to resolve by condemning the abuses within the system but without
alienating the Chinese elites by attempting to end it.77
Partly because of the increased interest in social welfare throughout
the British Empire but also because British reformers began to take
a stronger interest in Hong Kong, debates about the mui-tsai system
were revived in the 1920s and the 1930s. One of the most intense
and protracted British colonial policy disputes in the interwar period,
the anti-mui-tsai campaign had three main differences from that in
the 1870s and the 1880s. It focused more on the system itself rather
than on the prostitution aspect. This time the campaign had help
from all sorts of places: British women in Hong Kong, a small group
of local Chinese, members of Parliament in Britain, religious leaders
(including the archbishops of York and Canterbury) and international
women’s groups. And since the system had been banned (but never
effectively enforced) in China after the 1911 revolution, no one in
75 Sinn, “Chinese Patriarchy,” 143.
76 Lethbridge, “Chinese Voluntary Association,” 65, 82, 89–90.
77 Poon Pui Ting, “TheMuiTsaiQuestion inHongKong (1901–1940), with Special
Emphasis on the Role of the Po Leung Kuk” (MPhil Thesis, University of Hong Kong,
2000), 183.
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Hong Kong could claim that it should be allowed simply because it
was a Chinese tradition.
But even though theFemaleDomestic ServiceOrdinancewas passed
in 1923, the bill ended up doing little except to prohibit any new mui-
tsai transactions and domestic service for girls below 10 years of age.
Although reports in the mid-1930s suggested that the number of mui-
tsai had probably increased after 1923, the bill temporarily ended all
agitation in Britain. The mui-tsai issue re-emerged, however, after the
Guangdong government abolished all forms of slavery in March 1927
and cancelled the deeds for the transfer of mui-tsai. In response to so
much pressure, in 1929 the Legislative Council passed an amendment
stipulating that all mui-tsai were to be registered and paid wages.
Finally, in response to increased pressure in Britain and a colonial
inquiry prompted by the League of Nations’ Permanent Advisory
Committee of Experts on Slavery, in April 1938 the Legislative
Council passed legislationmaking it compulsory to register all adopted
girls with the secretary for Chinese affairs. However, this affected only
girls who were actually registered (of which there were still more than
1,000) and did little to end the large number of girls being sold into
prostitution. The mui-tsai system lasted until after World War II, with
cases being reported even into the 1970s.78
Charles Elliot’s proclamation of 1841 guaranteeing that Chinese in
Hong Kong could keep their own religions and customs was aimed at
minimizing resistance from the indigenous Chinese population and
attracting Chinese merchants from the mainland to Hong Kong. In
this, the proclamation was generally successful. Hong Kong’s colonial
founders could not, however, have predicted that the Chinese elites
would be able to use this proclamation to their own advantage. In
their warnings against government interference in the daily lives of
the Chinese population, Chinese members of the various councils and
boards frequently referred to Elliot’s proclamation. In May 1887, for
example, Ho Kai, the most Anglicized member of Hong Kong’s new
Chinese business and professional elite, and a permanent director of
the Po Leung Kuk, opposed as ‘wholly unnecessary’ a proposed bill
78 On the mui-tsai controversy in the 1920s and 1930s, see Norman J. Miners, “The
Attempts to Abolish the Mui-tsai System in Hong Kong, 1917–1941,” in Elizabeth
Sinn (ed.), Between East and West: Aspects of Social and Political Development in Hong Kong
(HongKong,1990),117–131, and hisHongKong under Imperial Rule,1912–1941 (Hong
Kong, 1987), chapters 8 and 9; Susan Pedersen, “The Maternalist Moment in British
Colonial Policy: The Controversy over ‘Child Slavery’ in Hong Kong 1917–1941,” Past
and Present, 171 (2001), 161–202; and Poon, “Mui Tsai Question,” chapters 4–7.
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to improve sanitation standards in Chinese houses. Although Ho, a
British-trained physician and lawyer, had helped draft the bill when
he was a member of the Sanitary Board and knew that it would benefit
Hong Kong’s Chinese population, he suddenly argued that it violated
Chinese customs and that the Chinese should be left to live as they
pleased, regardless of overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. Ho
complained how:
Some Sanitarians are constantly making themistake of treating Chinese as if
they were Europeans. They appear to forget that there are wide constitutional
differences between a native of China and one who hails from Europe. They
do not allow for the differences of habits, usage, mode of living and a host
of other things between the two. They insist upon the theory of treating all
nationalities alike howevermuch theymay differ from one another physically,
mentally, and constitutionally . . . One might as well insist that all Chinese
should eat bread and beefsteak instead of rice and pork, just because the two
former articles agree better than the latter with an English stomach.79
As the Chinese petitioners had in 1878 and 1879, Ho used Elliot’s
proclamation to justify his opposition to the proposed bill. ‘As long
as we govern the Chinese according to our promise given while this
Colony was yet in its infancy, viz., to govern them as much as possible
in accordance with their manners and customs, and to respect their
religion and prejudices, wemust of a necessitymodify our laws in order
to meet their peculiar requirements’.80
When Chinese elites in Hong Kong resisted the colonial
government’s measures, they often saw themselves as protecting the
Chinese of Hong Kong against an intrusive colonial state. And they
could always point, for example, to the fact that the number of women
whofled fromChina toHongKongproved thatwomen therewere freer
than in China, or – as Ho Kai argued in 1890 – that the government’s
proposed prison reforms would only encourage poorer Chinese to
commit crimes so that they might be sent to prison, ‘where they can
have a lot of amusement and pay nothing’.81 But the policy of allowing
certain Chinese customs grafted itself onto another assumption that
had defined Hong Kong’s colonial rhetoric since the 1840s: because
themajority ofChinese inHongKong had come there voluntarily, they
79 “Dr Ho Kai’s Protest against the Public Health Bill, Submitted to the
Government by the Sanitary Board, and the Board’s Rejoinder Thereto,” Hong Kong
Legislative Council Sessional Papers, 1887, 404.
80 “Dr Ho Kai’s Protest,” 404.
81 Cited in Gerald H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai (Hong Kong, 1981),
111–112.
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neither expected nor deserved much from the colonial government.
For example, despite Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth afterWorld
War II, the colony remained well behind the rest of the industrialized
world in terms of social welfare. As G. B. Endacott, once the foremost
historian of Hong Kong and certainly no critic of colonialism in Hong
Kong, explained, ‘the unspoken assumption was that Asians, and in
particular the Chinese, were not forced to come to Hong Kong, and if
they did so that was their own affair and they must accept conditions
as they found them’.82 Many colonial officials feared that providing
too much social welfare would only attract more refugees from the
mainland. Twisted as this logic may seem, it echoed an old concern
shared not just by colonial officials and Chinese elites but also bymany
ordinary Chinese, who frequently justified Hong Kong’s poor working
and housing conditions by contrasting them with those on the Chinese
mainland. After all, it was a Hong Kong custom.
82 G. B. Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, Alan Birch (ed.) (Hong Kong, 1978), 320.
